EIA is the independent data collection arm of the Department of Energy (DOE) and is charged with gathering information needed to answer a broad range of energy policy questions. As a regulatory agency, FERC's focus is the collection of data needed to monitor and regulate entities under its jurisdiction.
B
While both EIA and FERC have made changes to their collection processes to reflect transformations in the industry structure, a crucial question remains: as restructuring continues, will the public have access to the sum of information needed to assess and monitor the industry?
EIA's Data Collection Programs
For decades both EIA and FERC have collected from electric utilities information aggregated on a monthly, quarterly or, most commonly, annual basis. Analysts use the resulting data series to assess the broad effects of policy decisions and to forecast where the industry is heading, in terms of energy supply, demand and prices, for example.
EIA began expanding its electricity data collection program in the early 1990s to reflect unregulated entities' growing participation in electric markets. To the data already collected from electric utilities, EIA added capacity and generation information submitted by nonutility generators (NUGs), defined to include utility affiliates as well as true independents. To get the NUGs' cooperation in filing, EIA agreed to keep the information confidential, but as electric power industry restructuring moved forward throughout the 1990s, utilities also began requesting confidential treatment of data.
Of particular concern to the utilities was the difference in filing requirements between traditional utilities and NUGs. EIA considered this issue in a 1998 proceeding and, as a result, increased the similarity in type of generator information filed by each sector, eliminated the confidential treatment of NUG data, and established confidential treatment for a few, select data items, whether they were reported by utilities or NUGs.
In limiting the scope of items allowed to remain confidential, Three years later, EIA reversed its stand on confidentiality and recommended that a broad array of annual data submitted be made confidential. By this time EIA was also collecting information from marketers selling power at wholesale and energy suppliers selling to end-use customers in retail choice states. Like NUGs, these entities
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Federal Register, Vol. 63, No. 137, p. 38621 (published Friday, July 17, 1998). are for the most part unregulated and unaccustomed to reporting transaction data. Perhaps one reason EIA proposed to broaden its confidentiality policy was in hopes of increased cooperation from these unregulated sectors of the industry. Better cooperation would allow EIA to compile a more complete and relevant database. The intent of the law is to give federal agencies an easy method of providing confidential treatment of data collected only for statistical purposes, thus avoiding disputes over whether a data item meets the FOIA criteria for exemption from public disclosure. However, the effect of the law is to give EIA virtually unchecked authority to decide what information will remain in the public domain. FERC collects data for regulatory, rather than statistical purposes, and so the new law should not have the same effect on its data collection policies. In the past EIA has proposed confidential data treatment for certain data items, but ultimately revised its proposal to be in line with FERC's more open treatment of data. However, the new law gives EIA a ready excuse to set its own course on confidentiality and not follow FERC's lead.
FERC's Role in Data Collection
EIA and FERC's traditional data collection programs-focused on historical, aggregated information-remain useful in assessing industry trends and addressing broad policy questions. However, they fail to provide the information needed for a second, crucial role: market monitoring. The burden in this regard falls on FERC, as it is the regulatory agency charged with assuring that markets are functioning properly.
Prior to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, utilities sold wholesale power at cost-based rates and FERC could use the company's annual historical data to make a credible assessment of the reasonableness of the rates. However, once FERC began granting utilities and power marketers authority to make wholesale sales at market-based rates, the standards for rate reasonableness changed since any rate resulting from the workings of a competitive market was deemed reasonable. Rather than address the actual cost of providing power, FERC now would have to consider the degree of competition in the market and a company's ability to exert market power. It seeks to do this primarily through regulating the independent system operators (ISOs), regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and other transmission providers, and imposing initial requirements for market-based rate approval. 
Conclusion
P ublic access to information necessary for assessing and monitoring the electricity industry is threatened on two major fronts. Will historical, trend data continue to be available, or will EIA succumb to entreaties from the merchant sector and use its new authority to confer confidentiality status on a broad array of information? Will FERC require broader access to real-time data in order to improve market oversight, or will the commission continue to limit the availability of this critical information?
